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In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race 
Abstract. In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new 
metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative 
classificatory issues.”  Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-
substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics.  However, I show 
that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race.  
One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics. 
1. Introduction 
 In David Ludwig’s (2015, 44) recent article “Against the New Metaphysics of Race,” he 
argues for the provocative thesis that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.”  Furthermore, to continue to engage in such a 
“methodologically dubious metaphysics of race” is, in Ludwig’s (2015, 262) opinion, “a bad 
idea.”  Key to Ludwig’s critique is that he defines “metaphysicians of race” as “committed to the 
ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” much like other metaphysicians engaged in 
mainstream analytic metaphysics (Ludwig 2015, 245).  Furthermore, for Ludwig, “the new 
metaphysics of race” consists of disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race” (Ludwig 
2015, 245).  In his critique, Ludwig focuses on two debates in the new metaphysics of race.  
The first is the debate about whether races exist according to the one fundamental 
meaning of ‘race’ in current, ordinary English in the United States (Ludwig 2015, 257).  I’ll call 
this the US race debate*.1  According to Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 256, 260), some interlocutors 
                                                          
1 The asterisk is intentional.  I’m calling this debate ‘the US race debate*’ because I think 
Ludwig has changed the focus of the relevant debate.  I borrow the convention of using an 
asterisk to flag when the meaning of a term has been changed from Joshua Glasgow (2009, 140). 
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in the US race debate* are Anthony Appiah, Joshua Glasgow, Michael Hardimon, Sally 
Haslanger, Quayshawn Spencer, and Naomi Zack.   
The second debate in the new metaphysics of race is about whether humans have races 
according to the one fundamental meaning of ‘race’ in the life sciences (Ludwig 2015, 254).  I 
will call this the biological race debate*.  Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 259) claims that, among 
others, the interlocutors of the biological race debate* are Robin Andreasen, Bernard Boxill, 
A.W.F. Edwards, Adam Hochman, Jonathan Kaplan, Koffi Maglo, Armand Leroi, Massimo 
Pigliucci, Neven Sesardic, and Alan Templeton. 
Ludwig defends his thesis using an argument premised on the claim that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics 
from contemporary metametaphysics: one from Eli Hirsch, one inspired from Theodore Sider, 
and one from Ludwig himself.  The relevant background here is that recent metametaphysics has 
been preoccupied with what constitutes a “substantive” metaphysical dispute, which, roughly, is 
a dispute that is really about metaphysics as opposed to some other topic, like how we use 
language (Hirsch 2005, 67). 
While I agree with Ludwig that to engage in a metaphysics of race that confuses 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues is a bad idea, and while I think that the new 
metaphysics of race (as Ludwig defines it) might be based on such a confusion, I will show that 
the work that actual metaphysicians of race are doing involves no such confusion.  In other 
words, the point of this paper is show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of the 
actual metaphysics of race. 
For clarity, by ‘actual metaphysicians of race’, I’m talking about the same group of 
scholars that Ludwig is talking about in his critique, and by ‘actual metaphysics of race’ I’m 
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talking about the same body of work that Ludwig is talking about in his critique.2  However, 
unlike Ludwig (2015, 245), I will not require actual metaphysicians of race or actual metaphysics 
of race to be “committed to the ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” even with respect to 
a particular linguistic context.   
I will begin by clarifying Ludwig’s argument and his defense of each premise.  Second, I 
will show that even if Ludwig’s argument is a good critique of the new metaphysics of race, it’s 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  Finally, I will provide closing remarks where, 
among other things, I will clarify how the actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in the philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.  As for 
objections, I will respond to them along the way. 
2. Ludwig’s Argument and Its Defense 
2.1 The Basic Argument 
 Though Ludwig does not state his argument explicitly, a charitable reconstruction of it is 
below:  
(1) If the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive, then it is based on a  
confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues. 
(2) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(3) So, the new metaphysics of race is based on a confusion of metaphysical  
and normative classificatory issues. 
                                                          
2 For instance, like Ludwig (2015, 244), I consider Joshua Glasgow to be an actual 
metaphysician of race, and, like Ludwig (2015, 263), I consider Glasgow’s actual metaphysics of 
race to consist of work like his book A Theory of Race and his article “On the New Biology of 
Race.” 
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Ludwig states (3) as his thesis in the first paragraph of his opening remarks.3  Ludwig states (2) 
in his opening remarks as well and at several points throughout his paper.4  Ludwig also treats 
(2) as a reason for adopting (3).5  However, since there is a logical gap between (2) and (3), it’s 
charitable to add (1) as a suppressed premise.6   
2.2 Ludwig’s Defense of His Premises 
Though Ludwig takes the truth of (1) for granted, he offers three, in-depth defenses of (2) 
that utilize three different notions of non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s first defense of (2) 
is the following: 
(4) The new metaphysics of race is substantive only if there is exactly one  
allowable and fundamental ontology of race for each of its race debates. 
(5) If there is a plurality of legitimate biological subdivisions below the  
species level or a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ for 
each race debate in the new metaphysics of race, then there is a plurality 
of allowable ontologies of race for each race debate in the new 
metaphysics of race. 
(6) The antecedent of (5) is true. 
(7) So, it’s not the case that the new metaphysics of race is substantive. 
Ludwig claims (4) in section 3.1 and justifies his constraint on substantive metaphysics 
from how he defines ‘a metaphysics of x.’  For Ludwig (2015, 245, 251), a project on the 
                                                          
3 See Ludwig (2015, 244). 
4 See Ludwig (2015, 245, 260-262). 
5 See, especially, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4 in Ludwig (2015). 
 
6 [removed for blind review] 
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“metaphysics of x” assumes that metaphysicians of x are committed to “one fundamental 
ontology” of x that rules out “a plurality of equally allowable ontologies” of x, at least for the 
relevant linguistic context.7  Since a substantive metaphysics of x must at least be a metaphysics 
of x, it follows that a substantive metaphysics of x requires exactly one allowable and 
fundamental ontology of x.  Substituting ‘race’ for ‘x’ gives us (4).   
 As for (5), Ludwig states that the first disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s 
consequent in section 2.  Here Ludwig (2015, 247) follows Kaplan and Winther (2013) in 
arguing that if there is a plurality of equally legitimate but distinct ways of subdividing species 
into “legitimate biological kinds,” then “[e]mpirical evidence underdetermines the ontological 
status of race,” which in turn, permits a plurality of allowable ontologies of race (Ludwig 2015, 
246-247).  In particular, Ludwig (2015, 245, 247-249) argues that “both racial realism and 
antirealism” are allowable ontologies of race given different equally legitimate ways of 
subdividing a species, and even in the same race debate.  An example is how Zack (2002) uses 
the fact that humans have no subspecies to defend racial anti-realism in the US race debate*, 
while Spencer (2014) uses the fact that humans have a population subdivision that matches the 
current US census racial scheme to defend racial realism in the same race debate.   
 Ludwig states that the second disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s consequent in 
section 3.1.  In his words, “If there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’, 
there is also a plurality of equally allowable ontologies of race” (Ludwig 2015, 251).  
Interestingly, Ludwig never defends this assertion because he takes it to be obviously true.   
                                                          
7 See Ludwig (2015, 251) for (4) and see Ludwig (2015, 245) for Ludwig’s view on the 
metaphysics of x. 
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 Next, Ludwig defends (6) by defending the truth of each disjunct in the antecedent of (5).  
As for the first disjunct, Ludwig (2015, 246-247) argues that there is a plurality of legitimate 
biological divisions below the species level (e.g. population subdivisions, monophyletic levels, 
subspecies, etc.) because, first, legitimate biological kinds are interest dependent, and, second, 
there is a plurality of “explanatory interests” among biologists in different research contexts (e.g. 
population genetics, phylogenetic systematics, etc.).  As for the second disjunct, Ludwig reaches 
it by making an induction from what’s going on in the two most popular race debates in the new 
metaphysics of race: which are the US race debate* and the biological race debate*. 
Ludwig (2015, 254) argues that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of 
‘race’ in the biological race debate* since biologists in different research programs use ‘race’ in 
different ways that suit their needs.  For instance, Ludwig (2015, 254) points out that ‘race’ is 
often used as a synonym for ‘subspecies’ in systematic biology, but often used as a synonym for 
‘ecotype’ in ecology.  As for the US race debate*, Ludwig takes a more circuitous route to the 
conclusion that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ in that debate.  
First, Ludwig (2015, 255) appeals to Glasgow et al.’s (2009) empirical research on how 
Americans use ‘race’ to argue that ‘race’ is “polysemous” in the current US.  Next, Ludwig 
(2015, 257-258) argues that the context for the US race debate* has not been “sufficiently 
specified” to narrow the debate to “exactly one fundamental candidate meaning of ‘race’ in the 
United States.”  Hence, according to Ludwig, from induction, the second disjunct of (6) holds as 
well. 
Ludwig’s second defense of (2) utilizes Hirsch’s notion of non-substantive metaphysics.  
The second defense is below: 
(8) A dispute is merely verbal if each side can plausibly interpret the other  
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side as speaking a language in which the latter’s asserted sentences are 
true. 
(9) A dispute is non-substantive if it is merely verbal. 
(10) Each side can plausibly interpret the other side as speaking a language in  
which the latter’s asserted sentences are true in the new metaphysics of 
race. 
(11) Thus, the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(8) is a direct quote from Ludwig (2015, 259), which is itself a summary of Hirsch’s (2005; 
2008) view on non-substantive metaphysics.   
Hirsch defends his distinction between merely verbal disputes and ones that aren’t with 
several examples from the history of science and philosophy.  For instance, Hirsch (2005, 73) 
shows that the dispute among classical physicists about whether a projectile’s final velocity is 
equal to its initial velocity on Earth was not a merely verbal dispute because physicists on both 
sides could not charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true.  In other words, both sides 
were using the same meanings of ‘projectile’, ‘velocity’, ‘Earth’, etc., and what they disagreed 
about were the laws of motion.  In contrast, Hirsch (2008, 407-408) shows that the dispute 
between John Locke and Joseph Butler about whether a tree can survive a change in its parts was 
merely verbal since either side could charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true using 
the other’s meaning of ‘identity’.  In short, a merely verbal dispute for Hirsch is one where the 
disputants are either talking past one another or merely arguing about how we do (or should) use 
language. 
As for (9), we can infer that it’s a premise from how Ludwig (2015, 259-260) uses 
‘merely verbal’ and ‘nonsubstantive’ at this point in his paper.  Furthermore, Ludwig’s 
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vocabulary here is uncontroversial since it’s the same vocabulary that Hirsch (2005, 67) uses.  
As for (10), Ludwig endorses it when he says the following: 
Realists like Andreasen, Edwards, Leroi, Sesardic, and Spencer can interpret 
antirealists as speaking the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to 
subspecies, populations with visible traits that mark relevant biological 
differences, populations with cognitive differences, and so on.  Antirealists like 
Glasgow, Lewontin, Hochman, Maglo, and Zack can interpret realists as speaking 
the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to genetic clusters, patterns of 
mating, clades, and so on (Ludwig 2015, 259-260). 
Finally, Ludwig defends (2) in a third way using his interpretation of Sider’s notion of 
non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s third defense of (2) is below: 
(12) A dispute about an expression E is non-substantive if its disputants are 
endorsing multiple, equally joint-carving candidate meanings for E. 
(13) The new metaphysics of race is a dispute that is non-substantive according 
to (12). 
 (14) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(12) is directly from Ludwig (2015, 261), and is a rough summary of Sider’s (2011, 46-49) view 
of non-substantive metaphysics.  Sider defends the non-joint-carving condition in his definition 
of ‘non-substantivity’ from his stipulation of what metaphysics is about.   
For Sider (2011, vii) the “central task” of metaphysics is “to discern the ultimate or 
fundamental reality underlying the appearances.”  We are supposed to describe this reality using 
a privileged language, so-called Ontologese, which is privileged exactly because all of its 
expressions (e.g. terms, quantifiers, etc.) are “joint-carving,” which means that they carve out the 
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world’s fundamental structure (Sider 2011, vii).8  So, naturally, when we find that one or more of 
the expressions that we’ve used to formulate a question Q does not have exactly one, best joint-
carving meaning, it’s likely that a debate about Q is not about the fundamental structure of the 
world, and thus, is not a substantive metaphysical debate in Sider’s sense.   
With that said, it’s important to note that Ludwig’s summary of Sider is rough, and does 
not reflect Sider’s (2011, 49) “revised” definition of a non-substantive dispute.  What Ludwig 
presents is Sider’s unrefined view, which occurs at the beginning of section 4.2 in chapter 4 of 
Sider’s Writing the Book of the World.  However, later on in section 4.2, after Sider considers 
multiple problems with his unrefined view, he settles on what he calls his “revised” definition.9  
Nevertheless, since Ludwig uses Sider’s unrefined notion of non-substantivity in his critique, 
that’s what I’ll focus on as well.  However, for clarity, I’ll say that (12) expresses Sider-style 
non-substantivity as opposed to Siderian non-substantivity. 
In any case, Ludwig (2015, 261) asserts and defends (13) when he says that Spencer’s, 
Leroi’s, Pigliucci’s, and Hochman’s biological definitions of ‘race’ are all “equally joint-carving 
candidates” for ‘race’ because they are all “objective ways of distinguishing between populations 
below the species level.”  Furthermore, Ludwig (2015, 261-262) bolsters his support for (13) 
when he says that Hardimon’s, Glasgow’s, Feldman and Lewontin’s, and Appiah’s biological 
definitions of ‘race’ are also equally joint-carving candidates for ‘race’ because they are all “non-
joint-carving” meanings.  
3. Why Ludwig’s Argument is an Irrelevant Critique of Actual Metaphysics of Race 
                                                          
8 For Sider’s clarification of “Ontologese,” see Sider (2011, 171-173). 
 
9 For Sider’s “revised” definition, see Sider (2011, 49). 
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Even though Ludwig has provided a valid argument that may be sound as well, it turns 
out that Ludwig’s critique does nothing to undermine the actual metaphysics of race.  The latter 
is partially because Ludwig’s critique is not about the actual metaphysics of race, it’s about a 
hypothetical metaphysics that he calls ‘the new metaphysics of race’.   
Remember that the new metaphysics of race is, according to Ludwig (2015, 245), and by 
definition, constituted by disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race.”  Furthermore, 
remember that Ludwig claims that people like Glasgow, Haslanger, Appiah, and Spencer are 
engaged in one such dispute, the US race debate*, and people like Andreasen, Pigliucci, Kaplan, 
and Templeton are engaged in another such dispute, the biological race debate*.  However, these 
last two claims are simply false.   
For one, the term ‘fundamental ontology’ is not even a phrase used in actual metaphysics 
of race.  For instance, it does not appear once among the actual metaphysics of race that Ludwig 
(2015, 263-265) cites, and he cites 40 such publications.  Second, some actual metaphysicians of 
race embrace a pluralist ontology for the nature of race in the relevant context.  For example, at 
the beginning of Spencer’s (2014, 1026) article on the “national” meaning of ‘race’ in the US, he 
concedes that ordinary Americans are using multiple “geographic” and “ethnic” meanings of 
‘race’.  In fact, Spencer (2014, 1026) explicitly says, “Hence, I acknowledge upfront that there 
are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.”   
However, Ludwig could object here.  Specifically, Ludwig (2015, 257) interprets 
Spencer’s focus on the national meaning of ‘race’ in the US as an endorsement of it being “the 
only relevant candidate meaning for philosophical debates about the referent of “race” in the 
United States.”  While the latter is a possible interpretation of Spencer’s project, it’s not the most 
charitable one given how he presents his project at the beginning of his article.  Spencer (2014, 
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1025) begins by saying upfront that his project is merely “to debunk” the idea that “folk racial 
classification has no biological basis.”  Spencer attempts to accomplish that goal by showing that 
‘race’, in its national meaning in the current US, is a directly referring term for a biological 
entity—a set of particular human populations—that presently happens to be biologically real in 
virtue of being a level of human population structure.  Thus, given how Spencer (2014, 1026) 
presents his own project, his race theory is compatible with there being a pluralist nature of race 
in the current US context.  Furthermore, this interpretation best explains why Spencer (2014, 
1026) says that “there are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.” 
There are other actual metaphysicians of race who embrace pluralism about the nature of 
race as well.  For instance, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1162-1163) are happy to grant that both 
the ecotype and the subspecies are equally legitimate ways of dividing a species into biological 
races.  It’s just that they believe that humans have ecotypes, but not subspecies.  In fact, Pigliucci 
and Kaplan (2003, 1163) explicitly say, “Races, then, can be defined and picked out in a number 
of ways.” 
Finally, there are plenty of actual metaphysicians of race who do not embrace pluralism 
about the nature of race, but who do entertain pluralism as a metaphysical possibility, which is 
enough to show that they do not presuppose that there is a single fundamental ontology of race in 
the relevant context.  For instance, after obtaining messy results about how ordinary Americans 
use ‘race’ and race terms in a widely distributed survey, Glasgow (2009, 75) entertains the 
possibility that ordinary Americans are sometimes “talking past each other” when they use 
‘race’, much like we sometimes do when we use ‘jade’.  In fact, Glasgow (2009, 75) explicitly 
says, “So maybe ‘race’ is used in some contexts to refer to a social kind of thing and in other 
contexts to a biological kind of thing.”  That doesn’t sound like somebody who presupposes that 
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there is a single fundamental ontology of race in the US context.  Now, even though Ludwig’s 
argument is not about actual metaphysics of race, it could still be a relevant critique of actual 
metaphysics of race.  So to that I now turn. 
In order to know whether Ludwig’s argument succeeds in critiquing the actual 
metaphysics of race, we need to know more about the debates among actual metaphysicians of 
race.  Clearly, the US race debate* and the biological race debate* are not debates among actual 
metaphysicians of race.  However, the US race debate and the biological race debate are.  The US 
race debate is the debate about the nature and reality of race according to what ‘race’ means in 
the ordinary discourse of contemporary Americans, but only when ‘race’ is used to classify 
humans.  The latter debate actually exists because all of the individuals that Ludwig places in the 
US race debate* have expressed an interest in the focus I’ve just articulated.10  The biological 
race debate is the debate about whether humans have any races in a nontrivial biological sense of 
‘race’.  The latter debate actually exists as well.11  These are the two race debates that Ludwig 
was attempting to critique, and given these distinctions, we can see that Ludwig’s argument 
really isn’t relevant to these two debates. 
For one, neither the US race debate nor the biological race debate satisfies Hirsch’s 
criterion for a non-substantive dispute.  The US race debate is not a merely verbal dispute 
because racial realists in that debate, such as Haslanger and Spencer, cannot plausibly interpret 
racial anti-realists in that debate, such as Appiah and Glasgow, as speaking a language in which 
                                                          
10 For evidence, see Appiah (1996, 42), Glasgow (2009, 15), Haslanger (2012, 133), and Spencer 
(2014, 1025). 
11 For evidence, see Andreasen (1998, 200-201, 205), Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1161-1164), 
Maglo (2011, 362-363), and Templeton (2013, 262-263). 
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anti-realist race theories are true, and vice versa.  For instance, if Glasgow (2009, 33) is correct 
about (H1*) being part of the non-negotiable semantic content of ‘race’ in the ordinary discourse 
of Americans, then Spencer (2014, 1026) is incorrect about ‘race’ directly referring to a set of 
human populations in the national racial discourse of Americans, and vice versa.12  The 
biological race debate is not a merely verbal dispute either.  For instance, if Pigliucci and Kaplan 
(2003, 1165) are correct that humans subdivide into “biologically significant” ecotypes, then 
Hochman (2013, 347) is incorrect that humans do not subdivide into “meaningful biological 
units,” and vice versa. 
Next, even if the US race debate or the biological race debate is non-substantive in a 
Ludwigian or Sider-style sense, that fact does not imply a “confusion about metaphysical and 
normative classificatory issues” as (1) claims.  This is because actual metaphysicians of race are 
adopting a different view of substantive metaphysics—namely, one that does not require 
metaphysical disputes about race to presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race or 
anything about joint-carving.  Thus, while Ludwig’s argument is relevant to the hypothetical new 
metaphysics of race, it doesn’t make contact with actual metaphysics of race. 
Interestingly, when Ludwig defines ‘the new metaphysics of race’, he anticipates the 
worry that his focus on it may mischaracterize actual metaphysics of race.   In response, Ludwig 
(2015, 245) says, “However, I do not want to engage in a verbal dispute about the meaning of 
“metaphysics of race”… this article only challenges a certain type of metaphysics of race while 
proposing an alternative deflationist and normative metaphysics of race.”  However, this reply is 
                                                          
12 (H1*) is the claim that a race is, at least, a group of human beings that is distinguished from 
other groups of human beings by visible physical features, of the relevant kind, that the group 
has to some significantly disproportionate extent (Glasgow 2009, 33). 
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perplexing because if the new metaphysics of race is a purely hypothetical metaphysics that does 
not describe the disputes in actual metaphysics of race (as I’ve shown), and, in addition, if the 
disputes in actual metaphysics of race already do away with monist and fundamentalist 
assumptions about race (as I’ve shown), it’s hard to imagine what the purpose is for lodging 
Ludwig’s critique in the first place.  In any case, we can rest assured that actual metaphysicians 
of race are immune to Ludwig’s critique because they’ve already been vaccinated against monist 
and fundamentalist assumptions about race. 
5. Closing Remarks 
In this paper, I’ve shown that Ludwig’s critique of the new metaphysics of race is 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  However, I’ve said little about the conditions of 
substantivity that actual metaphysicians of race adopt.  In addition to the bare minimum of “not 
talking past one another” (Glasgow 2009, 28), actual metaphysicians of race embrace disputes 
about how certain linguistic communities actually use ‘race’ (e.g. Pigliucci and Kaplan 2003, 
1162-1163; Glasgow 2009, 6), and embrace disputes about how certain linguistic communities 
should use ‘race’ (e.g. Haslanger 2012, 221-247; Hochman 2014, 80).  However, actual 
metaphysicians of race do not embrace disputes that have unimportant social and scientific 
consequences.  For instance, Haslanger (2012, 300) motivates the US race debate by pointing out 
that engaging in it will help us frame and evaluate social policies and appropriately address 
stubborn inequalities in health.  Also, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1170) point out that engaging 
in the biological race debate can help biologists debunk hereditarian hypotheses about race and 
intelligence, yield insights into human evolutionary history, and yield insights into human 
migration history. 
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Interestingly, the criteria for substantive metaphysics that actual metaphysicians of race 
adopt make the metaphysical disputes in the actual metaphysics of race more akin to 
metaphysical disputes in the philosophy of science (e.g. the species debate, the nature of natural 
kinds, the ontic structural realism debate, etc.) than those in mainstream analytic metaphysics 
(e.g. debates about the nature of fundamentality, grounding, modality, substantivity, etc.).  For 
instance, Matthew Slater’s (2015) stable property cluster theory of natural kinds has a real shot at 
explaining why some kinds support epistemically reliable inductions in a domain while others 
don’t, which could help systematic biologists achieve more agreement about how they should 
classify organisms into species and higher taxa.  So, much like disputes in the actual metaphysics 
of race, there are practical payoffs to science or society for engaging in metaphysical disputes in 
the philosophy of science.  However, mainstream analytic metaphysics does not guarantee a 
payoff for science or society.  For instance, what exactly is the payoff for science or society in 
debating about “the” nature of substantive metaphysics?  
Perhaps Sider (2011, 47) sums up my point best when he says, “… this concept is not 
intended to apply to everything that might justly be called “nonsubstantive”.  For example, it 
isn’t meant to apply to equivocations between distinct lexical meanings (as in a dispute over 
whether geese live by “the bank”, in which one disputant means river bank and the other means 
financial bank)… Nor is it meant to capture the shallowness of inquiry into whether the number 
of electrons in the entire universe is even or odd (an inquiry that is substantive in my sense, but 
pointless).” 
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